Banks Claims on Private Sector and Monetary Policy Channel by Suhartono, S. (Suhartono) et al.
| 425 |
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, Vol. 14, No. 3 September 2010, hlm. 425–434
Terakreditasi SK. No. 167/DIKTI/Kep/2007
Korespondensi dengan Penulis:
Ab du l  M o ng id : Telp. +62 31 594 7151, Fax. +62 31 599 2985
E-mai l: abdul_mongid@yahoo.com
BANKS CLAIMS ON PRIVATE SECTOR AND MONETARY POLICY
CHANNEL
Suhartono
Abdul Mongid
FX Soegeng Notodihardjo
STIE Perbanas Surabaya
Jl. Nginden Semolo 34-36 Surabaya, 60118
Abstract
Banking industry is the main channel of monetary policy. As emphasized by the information-theoretic
approach, a central function of banks was to screen and monitor borrowers, thereby overcoming informa-
tion and incentive problems. By developing expertise in gathering relevant information, as well as by main-
taining ongoing relationships with customers, banks could control their business. Since 2000, Bank Indone-
sia started to implement a new framework of monetary policy and was initially applied in July 2005. The
impact of new monetary policy framework was investigated within the banking capital adequacy regula-
tion and economics framework. We found that stock exchange index (IHSG) was positive and significant at
1%. Other variables such as FINSHARE, GM2, NPL, CAR, BIRATE were negative and significant. In general,
we concluded that banking sector claims on the private sector was one of important monetary policy
channels.
Key words: monetary policy, private claims, bank capital
The increasing participation of banking sector in theIndonesia economy has been one of the most strikingstructural changes. The change was started after theintroduction of Pakjun 1983 (Policy package that al-low banking firms to determine their own interestrate and new product development) and Pakto 1988(Policy package 1988) which reduced the regulatorybarrier to establish new banking firm). At that time,the background to open the market was to mobilizethe domestic saving. The policy also open domesticbanking market to foreigner as an effort to increaseexport. This study is aimed to investigate the deter-minant of banking willingness to provide fund to pri-vate sector in nature of loan, refinancing, trade financ-ing and etc. This approach is further innovation for
study of bank lending channel similar to Nielsen(1999) which uses trade credit rather than tradition-ally used loan.The object of monetary policy is to influencethe performance of the economy as measured by in-flation, economic output, and employment. It worksby affecting demand across the economy that is,people’s and firms’ willingness to spend on goods andservices.Monetary authority main jobs is to create ashortage a “shortage” or “excessive” fund in the mar-ket to influence the economy. Contractive or shortagemonetary policy makes banks and other financial in-stitutions do not actually have enough liquidity to meettheir commitments because most liquidity are ab-
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sorbed by monetary authority. In ease monetarypolicy, central bank will reduce discount rate thatmakes liquidity abundant in the market. In Indone-sia, Bank Indonesia (BI) monetary policy will impactinto three steps:The first stage is that a change in the officialrate or expected money supply set by the board ofgovernor. It can be BI-Rate or Central Bank DiscountRate. Banks have to react to any official rate changeby changing their own savings and loan rates. Thechange will also affect the prices of many assets;shares, houses, gilt-edged security prices and so on.The exchange rate may change as demand and sup-ply of rupiah in the market to adapt to the new levelof interest rates. Finally there may also be an effecton the expectations of both firms and individuals. Theymay become more or perhaps less confident aboutthe future path of the economy.The second stage is that all these changes inmarkets will affect the spending patterns of consum-ers and firms. In other words there will be an effecton aggregate demand. Higher interest rates are likelyto reduce the level of aggregate demand, as consum-ers are encouraged to save rather that spend. Loandemand will decrease as cost of borrowing also in-crease.The third stage is the impact of the aggregatedemand change on GDP and inflation. Both short-termand long-term interest rates will be affected. Thebanks have to change the base rates. Higher interestrates will tend to reduce the prices of various assets.Shares (equities) are likely to be affected. The mar-kets will anticipate the effects of the higher interestrates on spending, and reduce the value the shares ofcompanies. Any future returns from shares will alsobe discounted by a larger amount, and so be valuedless. This will reduce the value of the shares.In academic work, how monetary policy im-pacted the economy is chanelled using various ap-proach. Taylor (1995) defined the monetary policytransmission as the process through which monetarypolicy decision are transmitted into change in the real
GDP and inflation. There are many many transmis-sion mechanisme such as interest rate, exchangerrate, asset price, credit and expectation.During a monetary contraction situation, bankswill decrease their reserves and reduce their depos-its and the loan. In a monetary expansion, banks in-crease the loan. If the decrease in deposits is not offsetby other funds which are not subject to reserve re-quirements, or by securities sale, this will result in adecrease in bank loans. If bank loans fall and bankdependent borrowers are dominant in the economy,real investment expenditure will fall. Since bank loansin Indonesia remain the main source of external fi-nance for business enterprises, a disrupting of bankloan supply can reduce the economic activity.Individuals are also affected by interest ratechanges. An increase in the interest rate will meanthat their disposable income is likely to have fallen ifthey are net borrowers. The most obvious impact ofthis is through the mortgage rate, given that 80% ofpersonal debt in this country is loans secured onhouses. Higher mortgage payments mean that peoplehave less money left to spend on other things and sospending is likely to fall.There is general agreement among economistsand policymakers that monetary policy works mainlythrough interest rates. When policy is tightenedthrough a decrease in reserve provision, for example,interest rates rise. A rise in interest rates leads to areduction in spending by interest sensitive sectors ofthe economy, such as housing and consumer pur-chases of durable goods. Banks play a part in this in-terest rate mechanism since a reduction in the moneysupply which consists mainly of deposit liabilities ofbanks is one of the principal factors pushing up in-terest rates. In this standard view of the monetarytransmission mechanism, however, there is nothingunique about bank lending. Indeed, the interest ratemechanism does not depend on what assets bankshold; the same response would occur regardless ofthe proportions of a bank’s assets that are held asloans or securities (Bernanke & Blinder, 1988).
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The credit channel is alternative way to mon-etary transmission mechanism. However, in otherwords, the credit channel is an enhancement mecha-nism of interest rate channel. This new view of mon-etary transmission emphasizes how asymmetric in-formation and costly enforcement of contracts cre-ates agency problems in financial markets (Bernanke& Gertler, 1995). As described by the credit channel, an exter-nal financial premium, which is a wedge between thecost of funds raised externally (by issuing equity ordebt) and the opportunity cost of funds raised inter-nally (by retaining earnings), has an important rolein economic activities. The size of an external financepremium reflects imperfections in credit markets thatdrive a wedge between the expected return receivedby lenders and the costs faced by potential borrow-ers. Monetary policy, which alters interest rate, tendsto affect the external finance premium in the samedirection. Thus, the direct effects of the monetarypolicy on interest rate are amplified by changes inthe external financial premium. This complementarymovement in the external finance premium may helpexplain the strength, timing, and composition of themonetary policy effects better than a reference to in-terest rates alone. Two mechanisms have been sug-gested to explain the link between monetary policyactions and the external finance premium: the bal-ance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.Haimowitz (1996) uses annual data across 450standard industrial classification (SIC) 4-digit manu-facturing industries in the United States to examinehow industry prices and output respond to monetaryshocks, and to examine how those responses are af-fected by certain industry characteristics. The indus-tries are classified according to whether they pro-duce durable goods or not, are highly concentrated ornot, produce goods for producers or goods for con-sumers, and whether they are able to hold relativelyhigh levels of inventories or not.Nilsen (1999) found that monetary contractionsimpacted bank to restrict some firms’ loans, thus re-
ducing their desired investment independently of in-terest rates. The study found that small firms increasetrade credit, a substitute credit, indicating a strongloan demand. It supports the bank lending channeltheory that banks do not voluntarily cut bank loansbut bank to increase fund provision to a less-desir-able alternative. Using trade credit is saver since un-like commercial paper, it is widely used by the smallfirms suffering the loan decline. Using individual firmdata, Nilsen (1999) found the reasons large firms usetrade credit are financial in nature to save cost of bor-rowing. Firms without a bond rating can increasetrade credit less expensive than entering to the mar-ket credit such as bond issuing. The bond rating is amark of quality which gives banks also primacy withloans from banks.Kim (1999), using Korean cases, found thatbank credit channel is significant after the crisis. Thesharp drops in credit supply in line to the easternAsia crisis reduced credit supply provided evidencethat contractive monetary policy was responded.There is strong evidence that a substantial excess de-mand for bank loans because of a dramatic decreasein loan supply as impact of banking crisis. Ibrahim(2004) found that bank lending required stability ofthe stock market and interest rate policy after thecrisis. Previously, Kasyap & Stein (1997) found sup-portive evidences that credit channel is as monetarypolicy channel. The study was using USA bank paneldata during 1976-1993. The study found evidencesthe impact of monetary policy that affected bank’spropensity to lend, especially among illiquid banks.For Indonesian cases, Agung (1998), using sampledata from 1985-1995, proved that a monetary policywas able to influence the bank supply of credit, inparticular small banks, not large banks which wereable to shield their bank loan supply by finding thecheaper source of funds from overseas. Further in-vestigation using aggregate data during episode ofcrisis, Warjio & Agung (2002) conclude that monetarypolicy is still effective to affect bank lending. How-ever different type of bank has different elasticity.
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De Haan (2001) using bank level data dividesall bank operating in the Netherlands into two classi-fications base on financial health and market orien-tation. The results for loan supply suggest that a lend-ing channel is operative in the Netherlands but be-come less effective for secured bank debt. It meanscontractive monetary policy does not have any nega-tive effect on secured bank lending.Fukuda, Kasuya & Nakajima (2005) conducteda study on the impact of non performing loan (NPL)and capital adequacy (CAR) on bank lending. Theirfinding found that banks facing with deteriorate capi-tal adequacy tend to reduce their loan provision es-pecially for small and unrated company. In otherhand, The deterioration of NPL ratios actually in-creased risky lending to troubled firm as their usu-ally willing to pay higher interest. The results implythat the different measures of bank health have dif-ferent implications for bank lending during the finan-cial turbulence in Japan.The study on the monetary policy strategy inIndonesia during the banking crisis has been investi-gated extensively especially by Fane (2000). Thestrategy was mainly controlling the growth of M0. Insum, achieving a modest target for domestic inflationwould not have been very different in practice fromsetting tight limits on the growth of M0.Mongid (2003) found that monetary variablessuch as discount rate policy, base money and ex-change rate policy are very important in determin-ing the banking credit. As the credit is very impor-tant to influences the economic activitiy, the resultprovide firmed evidence that monetary policy is im-portant as a tool to control economic activity via creditchannel. During the time of crisis, monetary policyvia bank credit is less effective. Very high coefficientof crisis dummy variables indicated that during thatperiod any action to control credit by increasing thediscount rate produced contra productive result.Other measure such as moral situation and tempo-rary credit control can be supplemented policies.Bluedorn & Bowdler (2009) point out that thereare multiple respond of banking industry to monetary
policy. There is impact on lending responses to mon-etary contractions at the same time banking firms tryto shield lending to saver borrower such holding com-pany affiliation. They also found sign reversals in theeffects conditional upon some characteristics. In somepoint, share price also very important specifically, theshare of securities in total assets which serve as atool to amplify policy transmission from exogenousinterest rate changes. One explanation for this resultis that many types of securities are subject to an ad-verse valuation effect following exogenous monetarypolicy contractions, which limits the scope for lend-ing at banks that hold them in large numbers.
METHODOLOGYThe point of departure of the study is based onassumption adopted from Worms (2001), The Reac-tion of Bank Lending to Monetary Policy Measures InGermany, ECB Working Paper 96, which states that acrucial condition for the existence of a credit channelthat works through bank loans is that monetary policyshould be able to change the supply of bank loans.The key point is that monetary policy besides shiftingthe supply of deposits also shifting the supply of bankloans. In this context, the crucial response of banks tomonetary policy is their lending response and nottheir role as deposit creators.According to Warjio & Agung (2002) there aretwo necessary conditions for the validity of the banklending channel; bank loans and securities must beimperfect substitutes for some borrowers, or someborrowers are bank dependent, second the centralbank must be able to constrain the supply of bankloans using all available instruments. It seems theseconditions are valid in Indonesia case especially if werefer to Agung (1998).The data will be used in this study are banklevel data, monetray policy data and collected mainlyfrom Bank Indonesia database Blomberg, Datastreamand Asia Development Bank. The data is monthly andcover the period of 2003-2009. Variables employedin this study are: (1) Claims on the Private Sectorbased on year on year percentage change (KLAIM).
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Total claims consist of loan and other claims. (2) Com-posite Stock Price Index based on monthly average,indexed as January 2007=100 using local currency.Data collected from Bloomberg Database (IHSG). (3)Growth of Broad Money based on annual growth per-centage, using local currency. Data is collected fromBank Indonesia Financial Statistic (GM2). (4)Nonperforming Loans is percentage non current loanof total commercial bank loans. Data is from Bank In-donesia (NPL). (5) Policy Rate is set by Bank Indone-sia, in percentage, data is collected from BloombergLP Data Stream (SBI). (6) Risk-Weighted Capital Ad-equacy Ratios is percentage of capital to risk-weighted assets. Data is from Bank Indonesia (CAR).
The analysis of the study is based on a timeseries regression to cover the impact of monetarypolicy variables, economic variables and banking sec-tor variable and economic error effect that alwaysviable in the time series modeling. To begin, the func-tion is represented as:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy Variables 
BI Rate 
M2  
 
Result: 
Claim on 
Bank  
Financial Economy  
Stock Exchange Index 
Financial Stock Index  
Banking Data 
Bank Capital 
NPL 
Figure 1. Framework of Analysis
BPC=α + βn Xi,t + + εt  Where BPC is bank claim to private sectors;Xi,t is policy rate, capital adequacy, stock price index,non performing loan, broad money and financing sec-tor stock index for each period. The å denotes to errorterm. To estimate the impact of monetary policy vari-ables to the private claim, the model of analysis usedin this study is linear regression using the bank claimto private sector as dependent variable. Estimation iscarried out using Eview Statistical Packard Program.
 BIRATE CAR FINSHARE* GM2 IHSG* KLAIM NPL 
 Mean  9.21  20.46  76.14  12.58  78.16  24.43  5.92 
 Median  8.75  20.71  70.71  14.24  72.21  23.59  6.13 
 Maximum  12.75  25.30  142.03  20.35  154.39  40.20  8.42 
 Minimum  6.50  16.70  22.79  4.26  22.05  8.67  3.20 
 Std. Dev.  1.82  2.00  32.18  4.67  37.98  8.22  1.66 
 Jarque-Bera  6.47  1.64  3.64  7.74  5.19  2.69  6.48 
 Probability  0.04  0.44  0.16  0.02  0.07  0.26  0.04 
Normality No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
 Observations  57.00  82.00  82.00  78.00  82.00  81.00  82.00 
 
Table 1 present the statistics of the data used inthe study. BI rate as policy variable has mean value9.21% with the median value is 8.75%. There are 57observations since the introduction of this policy rate.The data is not normally distributed. Second policyvariable is growth of broad money (GM2). The meanvalue is 12.58 meaning average annual growth ofbroad money is 13%. During the observation, the low-est annual growth is 4.26% in January 2003. The datais not normally distributed.We use two banking sector variables: capitaladequacy ratio (CAR) and non performing Loan (NPL).Mean value for variable CAR is 20.46% and it is farexceed the minimum regulatory of 8%. In generalIndonesian banking is on excessive capital. The mini-mum of the CAR is still twice the regulatory set. CARis normally distributed. NPL as a measure of bad loanin regulatory perspective is set at maximum 5%. The
*Index January 2007 = 100
Table 1. Descriptive Statistic ( %)
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mean value is 5.92% so it is exceeding the regulatorystandard. Maximum NPL is 8.42% and the minimumis 3.20%. The NPL is decreasing steadily.Financial economic variables used in this studyare financial share index (FINSHARE) and stock ex-change index (IHSG). We do not used Certificate ofBank Indonesia (SBI) as this variable is correlated toBIRATE. Mean for FINSHARE is 76.14 with maximumvalue is 142.03 and minimum is 22.79. Data is nor-mally distributed. IHSG is general stock price index. Themean is 78.16 and maximum is 154.39 and minimumvalue is 22.05. The data is not normally distributed.Claim on private sector as mentioned before isa total claim of banking industry to private sector. Weuse this definition to investigate the real impact ofeconomic condition on banking industry decision. Bythis definition, we eliminate the claim on governmentwhich is mostly determined by non economic condi-tion. Mean value for KLAIM is 24.43 with minimum8.67 and maximum is 40.20. The data is normallydistributed.Table 2 presents the result of the estimationmodel where private claim (KLAIM) as dependentvariables. From the table we can see that growth ofprivate claim positively related to IHSG and nega-tively to FINSHARE. Monetary policy variable,BIRATE, is negative and significant meaning that anyincrease in policy rate will decrease bank willingnessto provide claim to private sector. However, GM2, asindicator of intermediate target of monetary policy,has negative sign but not significant.
In the banking industry perspective, the threemonth lag NPL has negative impact to willingnessbanking industry to provide claim on private sector.This result is reasonable as most of private claim is inloan. It means any increase in NPL, basically will de-crease willingness of bank to produce more loans. Thethree month lag is the best as it provide banks ampletime to adjust their position.The variable CAR is producing astonishing re-sult as it is negative. The result can be interpreted asany increase in CAR will decrease the willingnessbanking industry to provide more claim to providesector. It is very strange as rational banker will al-ways maintain lower regulatory capital to increaseshareholder values. With this result, it provide fur-ther evident that Indonesian banker is more risk aver-sion. The rational of this kinds behavior can be tracedfrom regulatory perspective. After the crisis 1998,bank is very prudential and capital is becoming thestandard for sound banking rating. The pressure toprovide minimum capital Rp. 100 billion made manybanks to attract more capital from outside such as for-eign investor and merger.The temptation to maintain higher capital ra-tio is also supported by the availability of investmentinstrument to perform such business policy. Bankingindustry can buy central bank certificate (SBI) thatprovide quite high yield but less capital requirement.Under banking capital regulation standard, SBI haszero risk weighted rate. It means bank still enjoy print-ability and maintain higher capital. At the same time,
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 100.8454 10.17117 9.914825 0.0000 
IHSG 0.250968 0.067638 3.710427 0.0006 
FINSHARE -0.481261 0.091592 -5.254386 0.0000 
GM2 -0.134179 0.272634 -0.492158 0.6251 
NPL(-3) -1.632461 0.506008 -3.226155 0.0024 
BIRATE(-3) -2.819690 0.473662 -5.952958 0.0000 
CAR(-2) -0.945586 0.435889 -2.169325 0.0356 
Adj-R-Square=83%, F-Test= 42 (1%) 
 
Table 2. Estimation Result
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banks are relying on short term funds that requirebanks to provide liquidity buffer.Looking at the adjusted R-squared, the valueis 83% meaning that the model can explain 83% ofthe variability of private claim. The F-test ratio is 42and significant at 1%. We can conclude that the modelis viable to be used for the analysis. However we sus-pect that the error is not constant. To test if theheteroschedasticity exist, we conduct the ARCH-Testby modeling error term. From the test we found thatObserved R-Squared 22.46. It means that the resultconfirmed the existence of ARCH effect. It is the na-ture of macroeconomic and financial time series data.To solve this problem, we remodel the equation byconsidering ARCH Effect. See Table 3.Table 3 presents the result that consider errorterm that change over time. We found that ARCH ef-fect is viable and significant at 5%. This finding con-firm that banking firm willingness to provide claimto private sector is becoming less capable to be ex-plained by set of variable used in this modeling above.The other variable that related to time may improvethe ability of the model to explain the behavior of bank-ing to provide more claims to private sector. Further-more, the ARCH coefficient is still low indicating timevariance is still tolerable.Comparing Table 2 and Table 3, we can con-clude that result is similar. Constant is slightly lowerfrom 100 to 95. IHSG is lower than without consider-
ing variance in the model but still significant at 1%.FINSHARE is getting higher and still significant at1%. GM2 is still negative and not significant. NPL isalmost unchanged and still significant at 1%. CAR isslightly higher and substantially increase the signifi-cant level form 5% to 1%. BIRATE is also getting higherand significant at 1%. In general only NPL is sub-stantially different from the model without time vari-ance.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C 95.24115 6.432307 14.80669 0.0000 
IHSG 0.222470 0.041367 5.377951 0.0000 
FINSHARE -0.432823 0.059660 -7.254841 0.0000 
GM2 -0.023611 0.176165 -0.134026 0.8934 
NPL(-3) -1.613534 0.286471 -5.632458 0.0000 
BIRATE(-3) -2.693120 0.364012 -7.398447 0.0000 
CAR(-2) -0.879606 0.230676 -3.813166 0.0001 
 Variance Equation 
C 3.020005 1.431697 2.109388 0.0349 
ARCH(1) 0.916764 0.455900 2.010886 0.0443 
GARCH(1) -0.077223 0.110715 -0.697491 0.4855 
 
Table 3. Estimation Result After Considering ARCH Effect
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Figure 2. Plot of Fitted, Actual and Residuals
Related to the stock exchange variables, we canthat the banking industry requires the stability ofstock market. In the stock index, any increase willpositively related to higher growth of private claims.This situation means that although the strict regula-tion to prohibit bank involving in the stock trading,the implicit relationship is exist. As the stock marketindicates the future performance of the economy ingeneral, it is clearly uncovered that banking industryshares the same spirit to stock market. At the same
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time, effort to shield also occurred. Bank tend to re-duce the provision of private claim when financialshare index (FINSHARE) increase. This is very inter-esting because there is no clear explanation why thissituation exists. Is it because private claim is regardedas a risky investment?.The ARCH effect can be noticed from the Fig-ure 2. It is clear that after 2008, the ability of themodel to predict the result decrease. Wider residualindicate unstable condition. It supports the claim thatglobal crisis in 2008 affected Indonesian economyespecially on stock price and bank lending. As banklending is the most part of claim on private sector, theevidence provides support that stock market also in-fluence the bank behavior on lending. On the reliabil-ity of the model, after we consider the ARCH effect, westrongly believe that the model is reliable. From theerror term, we conducted test whether the error isnormally distributed or not. Using Jarque-Berra test,we conclude that the error is normally distributedand heteroschesdaticity solved.
CONCLUSIONSince 2000, Bank Indonesia started to imple-ment a new framework of monetary policy academi-cally known as inflation targeting. By this framework,Bank Indonesia set an explicit target for monetarypolicy, generally stated in terms of the inflation rate.The new framework was initially set in July 2005. Inthis paper we conducted a study on the impact ofmonetary policy, banking capital adequacy and stockexchange index on banking industry’s willingness toproduce a claim on private sector. Claim on privatesector is total claims that banking industry own toprivate sector.Stock exchange index provide two competingresult. For IHSG, the coefficient is positive and sig-nificant. On the other hand, share of financial sectorindex (FINSHARE) produce a negative sign and sig-nificant. These results indicate that the competingresult may evidence the nature of prudential behav-ior among banking firms in general.
Monetary policy variables are measured usingtwo items. For growth of broad money (GM2), theresult is negative but not significant. The result un-derline that banking firms do not recognize broadmoney as policy variable. BI Rate as indicator of thepolicy stance of Bank Indonesia produce negative signindicating that banking industry has been using thispolicy rate as policy indicator. In general, the resultindicating that banking firm is still viewing BI rateas a stimulus and as a breaker.Banking industry variables measured by NPLand CAR. Both of variables indicate negative signimplying that higher NPL is lowering capacity to pro-vide more claim to private sector. Strangely, CAR alsohas negative sign implying bank capacity to retainhigher CAR by shifting from private claim to claim oncentral bank. In the future, further investigation onthe impact of capital adequacy on bank behaviorshould be elaborated under the framework of mon-etary policy channel.
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